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I 
I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS J. MONTER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
KRA TZER'S SPECIAL TY BREAD 
COMP ANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
12810 
This was an action by a landlord for unlawful de-
tainer, and a counterclaim by his tenant for damages re-
sulting from a temporary eviction. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT 
The court, without a jury, entered judgment for 
plaintiff-appellant in the amount of $2,166.99, and for 
1 
defendant-respondent on its counterclaim in the amount 
of $102,278.56 general damages, and $3,000.00 punitin 
damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The judgment should be reversed and remanded 
with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff-appellant 
in the amount of $2, 166. 99 together with a reasonable 
attorney's fee, and for restitution of the premises; and to 
dismiss the counterclaim; or, in the alternative, remand-
ed with directions to grant a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Louis J. Monter, a retired Utah 
businessman now living in California, owns a lot and 
building at 1241 Major Street, Salt Lake City. Defend-
ant-Respondent, Kratzer's Specialty Bread Company 
(hereinafter called "Kratzer's") is a corporation en-
gaged in the operation of a bakery. 
On February 28, 1970, Mr. :Monter and Kratzer's 
entered into a lease agreement by the terms of which Mr. 
Monter's building was let to Kratzer's for use as a bakery 
for five years at $475.00 per month payable the first of 
each month (Exhibit 2-D). At the time the lease was en-
tered into the corporation was managed by Elsa K. Gliss-
meyer, but in about April, 1970, Jerome W. Yeck took 
control of the corporation and there commenced a series 
of defaults in payment of rentals. Mr. Monter filed an 
2 
action following which, in late 1970, the rentals were 
brought current and a security agreement executed by 
Kratzer' s ( R. 33-34) . At the same time the parties exe-
cuted an addendum to the lease (Exhibit 3-D) which 
contained the following provision: 
"Should tenant fail to pay any moneys due here-
under within forty-five ( 45) days after due date, 
landlord may at his option re-enter upon the 
leased premises and take possession of same and 
remove all persons from the leased premises, or 
may exercise any other remedy available to him 
by law resulting from the failure of the tenant to 
pay rent. In addition thereto landlord may, at his 
option, exercise all rights and remedies available 
to him under that certain security agreement cov-
ering the personal property and equipment upon 
said premises of even date herewith." 
After execution of the addendum Kratzer's paid the 
monthly rentals, though late, through July, 1971. It de-
faulted in the August, 1971, payment, and has made no 
rental payments since (except for a sum deposited in 
court in connection with this proceeding and later re-
turned to Kratzer's). 
\Vhen the August 1, 1971, payment had not been 
made by September 15, Mr. Monter's counsel com-
menced proceedings to obtain possession of the premises. 
A "notice to quit or pay rent" was served on Kratzer's on 
September 28, 1971 (R. llO). In early October, 1971, a 
check drawn by Donna Poulsen, a friend of Mr. Yeck's, 
was tendered to Mr. Monter's attorneys in payment of 
the August rental. Mrs. Poulsen had expected Mr. Yeck 
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to cover it but he did not (R. 181), and when presente<l 
to the bank for payment it was dishonored because there 
were insufficient funds in the account (R. 131). 
The August payment (as well as the September and 
October payments) not having been made, on October 
18, 1971, a complaint was filed in which Mr. Monter 
sought a writ restoring him to the premises, with the 
judgment to provide that he would have leave to amend 
his complaint after issuance of the writ of restitution in 
order to include a prayer for damages for waste and rent 
(R. 84-87). A shortened summons directing the defend-
ant Kratzer's to answer the complaint within three days 
was served upon Kratzer's on October 29, 1971 (R. 84, 
117), and the answer to the complaint became due on 
November 4, 1971.1 No answer was filed, and on No-
vember 5, a default ( R. 81) and a default judgment ( R. 
73) were entered, the judgment directing issuance of a 
writ of restitution (R. 73). 
On November 8, 1971, three days after entry of the 
judgment, writs of attachment ( R. 65) and restitution 
(R. 43) were served upon Kratzer's. Pursuant to the 
writ of restitution, the sheriff entered the premises and 
took possession. On the same day, a short time prior to 
execution on the writ, Kratzer's attorney called to the 
attention of Mr. Monter's attorney the provisions of 78-
36-10 U.C.A. 1953, claiming that Mr. Monter was not 
entitled to return of the premises until five days after 
entry of judgment. The sheriff nevertheless proceeded 
tlf the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply, the answer 
became due on November 1, 1971. 
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with execution of the writ of restitution and the bakery 
was closed about 2 :00 o'clock p.m. After some discus-
sions, Mr .. Monter's attorneys voluntarily released the 
premises about 4 :00 o'clock p.m., and the bakery was 
reopened and the employees back at work by approxi-
mately 5 :30 o'clock p.m. ( R. 150). 
In the meantime, on Friday, November 5, after the 
default judgment had been entered, an answer was 
mailed to the plaintiff's attorneys (R. 80). A motion to 
set aside the default was mailed to Mr. Monter's attor-
neys on November 10 and filed with the court on N ovem-
ber 12 ( R. 77). On November 19 an order was entered 
setting aside the default (R. 69) and permitting Kratz-
er's to file a counterclaim seeking $5,000.00 for lost busi-
ness and $5,000.00 punitive damages ( R. 62-64). Trial 
was set for December 10, 1971, approximately three 
weeks after the default was set aside. 
At the trial is was established that there was not any 
genuine issue of fact as to the amount of the rentals owed 
by Kratzer's, the amount included in the judgment be-
ing the exact amount claimed by Mr. Monter's counsel 
during his opening statement (R. 39, 41, 118). 
It was established that Mr. Y eek had been the man-
ager of Kratzer's for about 1V2 years (R. 158) and that 
under his and prior management Kratzer's had sold 
bakery products to Continental Baking Company for 
approximately 16 years (R. 152). 
Jack Hart, the bread sales manager for Continental 
Baking, testified that his company had been a customer 
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of Kratzer's during the five years of his employment (R. 
120) . On November 8, because of the inability of some 
of the employees of Continental to reach Kratzer's by 
telephone, he went to the bakery building and found it 
locked ( R. 124, 125), and thereupon decided to transfer 
orders for the following day to another company (R. 
125). After he had made this decision Mr. Y eek, Kratz-
er's managing officer, called and asked for a return of 
the business but this was refused because Mr. Hart did-
n't feel that he had any assurance of getting products 
from Kratzer's (R. 125). Continental had had previous 
difficulty with Kratzer's. About two or three weeks 
earlier there had been a problem arising out of the fact 
that Continental could not get products and had quality 
problems with products it did obtain ( R. 126). There 
had been numerous occasions in the past where a product 
furnished by Kratzer's had been stale, and Continental 
had received complaints from its customers about Kratz-
er' s products as far back as a year (R. 127). The num-
ber of complaints would vary from week to week, but 
Mr. Hart said he would not have terminated the con-
tract "then" except for inability to place the order on 
November 8 (R. 128). At the time of the trial he did not 
intend to give Kratzer's further orders (R. 129), and 
testified that the prior difficulties had entered into his 
decision to withdraw business from Kratzer's ( R. 129). 
Mr. Yeck testified that Kratzer's was able to pro-
duce the next day's product (R. 151), but that Kratzer's 
had received no business from Continental since N ovem-
ber 8. The counterclaim was based entirely on loss of the 
Continental account. 
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At the trial it was stipulated that Kratzer's received 
an average gross income from its Continental Baking ac-
count in the amount of $2,000.00 a month, and that of 
this 53% or $1,060.00 would go towards profit (R. 153-
154) . No evidence was introduced as to the length of 
time the Continental account might have been expected 
to continue, or as to the length of time it would take 
Kratzer's to mitigate its damages by obtaining other 
customers. At the trial the attorney for Kratzer's sug-
gested to the court that the length of time in the future 
was probably "a legal question" ( R. 154). 
On this evidence the trial court found that the ac-
tions of Mr. Monter (though he was in California 
throughout the proceedings and did not personally par-
ticipate in the actions complained of except through 
counsel) were intentional and malicious and resulted in 
the loss of the Continental Baking Company account; 
that Kratzer's would have received $1,060.00 per month 
as prof it from the Continental Baking Company account 
"indefinitely into the future"; and that the present value 
of $1,060.00 per month for ten years was $102,278.56 (R. 
40-41). The court entered judgment in favor of Mr. 
Monter for his rentals of $997.49 and damages of 
$1,169.20; and it entered judgment on Kratzer's counter-
claim in the amount of $102,278.56 for loss of business 
and $3,000.00 punitive damages, or a total $105,278.56. 
The $1,425.00 deposited in court by Kratzer's was 
ordered returned to it, and the judgment provided that 
payments due under the lease agreement between Mr. 
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Monter and Kratzer's for the month of December, rnn, 
and subsequent months, should be paid by deduction 
from Kratzer's unpaid judgment. The net result was 
confiscation of ..!\fr. Monter's property. 
Shortly after the trial, .Mr. .Monter's counsel learned 
that, notwithstanding representations and suggestions to 
the court that the Continental Baking bu~iness would 
likely continue into the indefinite future, Kratzer's was 
and had been in serious financial difficulties. It was dis-
covered that on January 10, 1972, one month after the 
trial, the United States Internal Revenue Service filed a 
Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the amount of $18,793.52 
(R. 30) for taxes due as early as March, 1971, which 
subsequently resulted in the sale of Kratzer's bakery 
equipment and other property on the leased premises. It 
was also discovered that there were in existence against 
Kratzer's at the time of trial, approximately 12 unsatis-
fied judgments, totaling approximately $14,000.00. 
These matters were called to the attention of the court in 
a motion for new trial filed on January 13, 1972 (R. 22), 
but after argument, and a request on the record that the 
court take judicial notice of the judgments, the court 
denied the motion and permitted the judgment to stand. 
This appeal resulted. 
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ARGUl\IENT 
I 
The court erred in holding that eviction of defend-
ant-respondent violated stay provisions of 78-36-10 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. 
The trial court interpreted 78-36-10 U.C.A. 1953 as 
providing for an automatic 5-day stay of execution, and 
held that eviction of Kratzer's pursuant to the writ of 
restitution was a willful and malicious wrong on the part 
of Mr. Monter. The section provides, in part: 
If upon the trial the verdict of the jury, or if the 
case is tried without a jury, the finding of the 
court, is in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant, judgment shall be entered for the resti-
tution of the premises. The jury, or the court if 
the proceeding is tried without a jury, shall also 
assess the damages * * * and any amount found 
due the plaintiff by reason of waste of the prem-
ises by the defendant during the tenancy alleged 
in the complaint and proved on tJhe trial, and find 
the amount of any rent due if the alleged unlaw-
ful detainer is after default in the payment of 
rent; and the judgment shall be rendered against 
the defendant guilty of forcible entry * * * for 
the rent and for the three times the amount of the 
damages thus assessed. When the proceeding is 
for an unlawful detainer after default in the pay-
ment of rent, and the lease or agreement under 
which the rent is payable has not by its terms ex-
pired, execution upon the judgment shall not be 
issued until the expiration of five days after the 
entry of the judgment, within which time the de-
fendant tenant or any sub-tenant, or any mort-
9 
gagee of the term, or other party interested in its 
continuance, may pay into court for the landlord 
the amount of the judgment and costs, and there-
upon the judgment shall be satisfied, and the 
tenant shall ~e resto~ed t<? his estate; but if pay-
ment as herem provided is not made within five 
days, the judgment may be enforced for the full 
amount, and for the possession of the premises. In 
all other cases, the judgment may be enforced 
immediately. (Emphasis added.) 
Even a cursory reading suggests that 78-36-10 deais 
only with trials, and that the stay provision applies where 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of rent due, and 
a trial of that issue. The legislative history of the forcible 
entry and detainer statute makes it clear that if there is 
no such issue, or if there is no trial, the defendant tenant 
can be evicted immediately upon entry of the judgment. 
The statute was enacted before statehood as Chap-
ter IV, Laws of Utah 1884, "Summary Proceedings for 
Obtaining Possession of Real Property in Certain 
Cases." As originally enacted, it consisted of 18 sections, 
1033 to 1051. The first nine sections defined forcible 
entry and unlawful detainer; provided for notices; cir-
cumscribed the jurisdiction of the courts; limited the per-
sons who needed to be made parties; set out the require-
ments for the complaint and summons; and provided for 
arrest in some cases. Commencing with Section 1043, the 
statute dealt with default and with trials. Section 1043 
provided: 
"If at the time appointed, the defendants do not 
appear and defend, the court must enter his de-
10 
fault and render judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff as prayed for in the complaint." 
Section 1044 provided that the defendant might appear 
and answer or demur. Section 1045 provided: 
"YVhenever an issue of fact is presented by the 
pleadings, it must be tried by a jury, unless such 
jury be waived as in other cases. The jury shall be 
formed in the same manner as other trial juries 
in the court in which the action is pending." 
Section 1046 set out what the plaintiff was required to 
show on the trial. Section 1047 provided for amendment 
of the complaint if upon the trial the evidence established 
a forcible entry or detainer other than that pleaded the 
one charged. Section 1048, substantially the same as the 
present 78-36-10, set out the remedies and the proce-
dures. Then, as now, the entire section was preceded by 
the words if upon the trial. The last three sections related 
to verification of pleadings, stays on appeal, and the ap-
plicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials. 
In 1898, following admission of Utah to statehood, 
it became necessary to re-enact provisions of the Utah 
statutes. The forcible entry and detainer statute ap-
peared as Title 73, Chapter 64, Revised Statutes of Utah 
1898. It continued in substantially the same form, except 
that the provisions relating to answers and demurrers, 
arrest, and entry of default were omitted. The omissions, 
however, can hardly show an intention to change the 
meaning of the retained sections inasmuch as the chapter 
was part of the Code of Civil Procedure and generally 
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subject to its provisions under §3587 R.S. U. 1898. Per-
missible pleadings were governed by §2958, and defaults 
for failure to answer were dealt with in §3179. The 
amendments indicated a legislative intent to utilize gen-
eral provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, not to 
give defendants greater rights in event of default. 
'l'o draw a distinction between default judgments 
and those entered after trials of issues relating to rent due 
makes eminent good sense. To apply the section's stay 
provisions to trials protects those tenants who have a 
genuine question as to the amount of rent they owe. They 
are permitted to litigate the matter without risking im-
mediate loss of the leasehold in event the triers of fact 
determine the issue against them. Without such a pro-
vision, tenants would be tempted to pay whatever amount 
was demanded by the landlord for fear that the trial 
might result in an adverse verdict or finding, and that 
even though they were contesting the rental claim in 
good faith they would have the estate forfeited without 
the opportunity to pay the amount found to be due. This 
view of the statute seems to have been adopted by this 
court in Commercial Block Realty Co. v. Merchants Pro-
tective Assn., 71 Utah 505, 267 Pac. 1009 ( 1928), which 
discussed the remedies provided by the section and indi-
cated that where the amount of rent is "in dispute'' the 
tenant may await the judicial determination of the 
amount and after judgment pay it and costs and be re-
stored to his estate. 
Inasmuch as the section refers to "trial," the mean-
ing of that word is of some importance. 
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A default judgment is not a trial. 
In Farrell v. DeClue et al. 365 S.W.2d 68 (.Mo. 
App. 1963), the .Missouri Court of Appeals in consider-
ing the question of what amounted to granting a "new 
trial" had occasion to discuss what was meant by trial. 
Ref erring to an earlier case, the court said: 
"The court construed the word 'trial' to mean a 
formal examination of contested issues before a 
competent tribunal in which both parties are pres-
ent and participate, and said that 'A mere inquiry 
of damages after a judgment by default is not a 
"trial," within the meaning of the statute.' They 
quoted with approval Black's definition of a 'new 
trial' as 'a re-examination, in the same court, of an 
issue of fact, or some part or portion thereof, after 
a verdict by a jury, report of a referee, or a de-
cision by a court.' " 
With respect to defaults, a similar position was 
taken by the appellate court of Indiana in Greenwell v. 
Cunnin,qiham, et al. 70 N.E.2d 684 ( 1948) the court 
said: 
"It has long been settled in this state that a final 
judgment entered on a failure of a party to appear 
does not involve a trial within the meaning of the 
statute providing for new trials through timely 
motion." 
The arrangement of the 1884 statute and the em-
phasis on trial demonstrate a legislative intent not to 
grant the "stay" privilege in default cases. Changes in 
other sections of the statute do not show an intent to 
change the meaning of present 78-36-10. The presump-
tion is that the original meaning continues. 
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In Tyson v. United States, 285 F.2d 19 (10 Cir. 
1960), the Court of Appeals was called upon to construe 
the meaning of words in an act of 1951, particularly 
whether the words "by law made current" referred to 
coins made current by the laws of the United States or 
by a foreign government. The Court of Appeals exam-
ined the original statute of 1806 and found that the term 
referred to coins made current by the laws of the United 
States. It rejected the contention that a reenactment of 
the statute in 1951 changed the meaning of the phrase. 
The court said: 
"A general rule of construction is that provisions 
of an original act or section reenacted or substan-
tially repeated in an amendment are construed as 
a continuation of the original law. Such provi-
sions are generally held to have been the law since 
they were first enacted." 
Re-enactment of the section in 1898 and subse-
quently should be construed as a continuation of the 
meaning in the original statute, and the section should 
not be construed as applying to judgments entered after 
a default by the tenant. 
Moreover, 78-36-10 provides for a stay only where 
the unlawful detainer action is based solely on the non-
payment of rent. There is to be no stay if the lease has 
"by its terms expired," or if the action is based upon 
waste or breach of covenants relating to matters other 
than rent. The section provides that "In all other cases 
[than simple non-payment of rent}, the judgment may 
be enforced immediately." 
14 
__,,,... 
I 
I 
In the present case the complaint was based on 
waste as well as failure to pay rent; in addition, the lease 
c.:ontained a provision permitting termination of the 
tenant's rights and repossession for failure to pay rent. In 
either such case a tenant is not entitled to a stay. 
II 
A stay of execution mu.Yt be obtained in the manner 
provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Even if the portion of Section 78-36-10 which pro-
vides for a stay of execution is deemed to apply to the 
facts in this case, such a stay is not automatic. 
Rule 62 (a), U.R.C.P., provides: 
Execution or other proceedings to enforce a 
judgment may issue immediately upon the entry 
of the judgment, unless the court in its discretion 
and on such conditions for the security of the ad-
verse party as are proper, otherwise directs. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure govern the proce-
dures in all actions, suits and proceedings "of a civil na-
ture" (Rule 1, U .R.C.P.), and all "special statutory pro-
ceedings." except insofar as they are "by their nature 
clearly inapplicable" (Rule 81, U.R.C.P.). 
Admittedly the rules may not abridge, enlarge or 
modify substantive rights (78-2-4 U.C.A. 1953), but 
assuming that a stay of execution in an unlawful detain-
er action for the nonpayment of rent is interpreted to be 
a substantive right, a rule of procedure may establish how 
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that right is to be exercised without thereby abridging, 
enlarging or modifying it. 
For example, the right to an appeal from a judg-
ment may be viewed as a substantive right. Such a right 
may be lost if a party fails to exercise that right in the 
form and manner prescribed by the rules of procedure. 
It has been held that rules prescribing the manner and 
conditions to enforce the right to an appeal do not 
abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive right of a party. 
See, for example, State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 
392 P.2d 775 (1964). Likewise, a rule requiring an af-
firmative act by the party seeking a stay of execution, 
would not abridge, modify or enlarge his right to such a 
stay. 
The forcible entry and detainer proceeding has been 
part of the Code of Civil Procedure since its first enact-
ment; it is a proceeding of a civil nature. But even if it be 
regarded as a special statutory proceeding it cannot be 
said that requiring a court order for the stay is "clearly 
inapplicable." The California statute upon which Utah's 
was based has been amended to do exactly that (§1174, 
California Code of Civil Procedure) . 
It follows that if Kratzer's had wanted to have exe-
cution of the judgment stayed, it should have applied to 
the court for the stay. Having failed to do so, it is in no 
position to complain. 
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III 
'l'he Court's findings as to damages were not sup-
ported by the evidence, were contrary to law, and were 
patently excessive. 
The evidence produced by Kratzer's in this case was 
insufficient to establish either the fact of damage or the 
amount of damages. 
The evidence most favorable to support the finding 
of the trial court consists of the following: 
For approximately sixteen years Kratzer's had sold 
bakery products to Continental Baking Company. On 
November 8, 1971, by virtue of execution on the writ of 
restitution, Kratzer's was closed down for a period of 
approximately three hours, although the possessory writ 
had been released within approximately two hours. On 
that afternoon ~Ir. Hart of Continental Baking Com-
pany came to the Kratzer's bakery to attempt to talk to 
someone about the next day's production, but finding the 
building locked decided to order the next day's produc-
tion elsewhere. Shortly thereafter Mr. Yeck, Kratzer's 
general manager, contacted Continental but the com-
pany would not change its mind, and since that time Con-
tinental Baking Company has not purchased bakery 
products from Kratzer's. Kratzer's did gross business 
with Continental of approximately $2,000 per month, 
$1,060 of which represented "profits." 
There was no evidence that Kratzer's had a con-
tract with Continental or anything more than the expec-
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tation of some additional business; that Continental's re-
fusal to resume business with Kratzer's was because of 
the fact that the company had been shut down for a short 
period; that the relationship between Kratzer's and Con-
tinental would have continued for any particular period 
of time; that loss of the Continental account resulted in 
a loss of profits for the total business; that it would in the 
future; or that the company would be unable to mitigate 
its damages by obtaining other customers to replace Con-
tinental. There was no evidence of the type of product, 
the demand for it, or the state of competition. 
In connection with the damages issue, it was estab-
lished through Kratzer's own witnesses that although 
Kratzer's had done business with Continental for ap-
proximately sixteen years, only the last 11/2 years were 
under Kratzer's current management; that for approxi-
mately one year Continental had been having difficulties 
with Kratzer's, both from the standpoint of obtaining 
necessary products and the quality of the products ob-
tained; that Continental did not resume purchasing 
products from Kratzer's because Mr. Hart felt he did 
not have any assurance that he would be able to continue 
getting the production; and that prior to initiation of the 
action by Mr. Monter, Kratzer's had fallen three months 
behind in the payment of rentals under its lease. 
On this state of the evidence the trial court made 
the following findings of fact: 
"15. That during the time that the defendant's 
business was closed down one of the defendant's 
customers, Continental Baking Company, was un-
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able to contact defendant and place its orders for 
that day, and sent a representative down to the 
premises of defendant and saw that the place was 
closed and no one working and decided that they 
would no longer do business with defendant. 
"16. That Continental Baking Company was a 
customer of defendants for some seventeen ( 17) 
years prior to the 8th day of November, 1971, and 
would have continued its business relationship 
with defendant except for the fact that it was un-
able to fill its orders on that day. 
"17. That the average gross business done by 
defendant with the Continental Baking Company 
prior to the 8th day of November, 1971 was 
$2,000 per month of which was 53% or $1,060 
per month represented profit to defendant. 
"18. That defendant would have received 
$1,060 per month profit from the Continental 
Baking Company account indefinitely into the 
future. 
"19. That the present value of $1,060 per 
month for ten ( 10) years is $102,278.56." 
Although the cases do not always separate the prob-
lems, it is recognized generally that proof of damages 
involves two separate aspects: ( 1) proof that plaintiff 
was in fact damaged, and ( 2) the amount of the damage. 
The fact of damage must be proved with the same degree 
of proof as other damages, and when so proved, the 
amount may be proved with a lesser degree of certainty. 
But both must be proved with "reasonable certainty," 
and in no event may lost profits be awarded if they are 
"uncertain, contingent, conjectural, or speculative." 
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They must be based upon facts from which a reasonably 
accurate conclusion can be logica!W and rationally 
drawn. See 22 Am.Jur.2d., Damages, §§171, 172, 177. 
T 
I 
With respect to the fact of damage, plaintiff's evi- , 
dence was unsatisfactory. In the first place, the ques- i 
tion of causation was a haunting one. Continental's man, 
Mr. Hart, testified about a year's poor performance on 
1 
the part of Kratzer's. And although he said he had or- ' 
dered the next day's product elsewhere because of the 
inability to contact Kratzer's, it was also established that 
Mr. Yeck contacted him almost immediately about the 
next day's product but Continental wouldn't give the 
business back. With respect to future business, Mr. Hart 
testified that he had no assurance that Kratzer' s would 
be able to perform. This "lack of assurance" cannot be 
attributed to Mr. Monter. From the evidence the only 
damage reasonably attributable to the 3-hour closing 
was the loss of one day's sales. 
But even with respect to the loss of one day's sales , 
to Continental, there was no proof as to the effect of such 
loss on the business as a whole. An injured party may 
not isolate one aspect of his business and base damages 
solely on that aspect. He must prove the total effect. 
In Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Company, 105 
Cal.App.2d 382, 233 P.2d 914 ( 1951), plaintiff, a ranch-
er sought damages for loss of income, based upon de-
struction of grazing land by emissions from defendant's , 
plant. The trial court instructed the jury that it could 
apply either a loss of income method or a loss of rental 
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value method in determining damages. The jury award-
ed damages based on the loss of rental value, and the 
plaintiff appealed. 
With respect to recovery of lost profits the Cali-
fornia District Court of Appeal stated: 
" ... The case, therefore, is one which would war-
rant recovery of damages measured by loss of 
profits. But when we speak of loss of prof its 
caused by injury to an e§tablished business we are 
speaking of the business as an operating unit. It 
appears without conflict that each of the appel-
lants operated a cattle business upon land areas 
owned or rented by them greatly exceeding in 
total the acreage affected by defendant's tort. 
Therefore it would not necessarily follow that be-
cause through that tort they had been deprived of 
the full pasturage use of a portion of the area 
used in conducting their business that they would 
have suffered any loss of gross income. They may 
have been put to greater cost to produce the gross 
income, in which event they would have been 
damaged by the amount of that greater cost. Not-
withstanding the diminished pasturage value of 
the affected lands, their gros.'I production of cat-
tle for market may have been equally great and 
none of the appellants proved anything to the con-
trary. What they proved was that upon the af-
fected areas they were able before the same was 
injured to pasture for portions of the year a cer-
tain number of range cows and that these cows so 
partially maintained upon the affected lands 
would have produced a certain number of calves 
which would have become available for the mar-
ket, but they did not prove that this loss of gross 
income actually occurred. To allow loss of profits 
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from injury to an established business, there must 
not only have been 'operating experience suffi-
cient to permit a reasonable estimate of probable 
income and expense,' but evidence must be in-
troduced which proves the probable income and 
expense and this showing must be made in re-
spect to the business as a whole. Such a showing 
the appellants did not make." 233 P.2d 914 at 
918. (Emphasis added.) 
The court held that there was insufficient evidence 
to instruct the jury to apply the loss of profit measure of 
damages. 
This court has adopted the view that damages may 
not be based on speculative or conjectural evidence. In 
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d. 83, 368 P .2d 597 ( 1962), 
the trial court had found damages to be the difference 
between the sales price of land in a breached contract and 
the price at which the same land sold under a subsequent 
contract. Recognizing that a subsequent sale may be evi-
dence of market value, the court noted that in the case 
before it there was a considerable difference in terms be-
tween the contract which was breached and the subse-
quent contract. With reference to other evidence relat-
ing to value, this court said: 
"The other supporting evidence for a $180,000 
dollar market value that the plaintiff claims to 
exist, such as plaintiff's opinion that the value of 
the [motel} would increase, and implications from 
the entire record, does not contain the degree of 
certainty which a reasonable ascertainment of 
market value would require. This is especially 
true where additional evidence was readily avail-
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able for a more accurate valuation. Damages can-
not be found from mere speculative and conject-
ural evidence .... " 368 P.2d 597 at 602. 
The rule stated applies to damages generally. It ap-
plies even more strongly to damages based on lost profits, 
because profits are of necessity greatly influenced by the 
normal and abnormal contingencies of commercial life. 
An of ten cited case dealing in some detail with the 
rule respecting lost profits and reasons for requiring evi-
dence of a particular type is Central Coal and Coke Co. 
v. Hartman, 111 Fed. 96 (8 Cir., 1901), an anti-trust 
action in which plaintiff claimed defendant had inflicted 
injury on his business, and the jury had awarded dam-
ages by way of lost profits. In holding the evidence with 
respect to lost profits insufficient the court of appeals 
stated: 
"* * * Now, the anticipated profits of a business 
are generally so dependent upon numerous and 
uncertain contingencies that their amount is not 
susceptible of proof with any reasonable degree 
of certainty; hence the general rule that the ex-
pected profits of a commercial business are too 
remote, speculative, and uncertain to warrant a 
judgment for their loss. * * * 
"There is a notable exception to this general rule. 
It is that the loss of profits from the destruction 
or interruption of an established business may be 
recovered where the plaintiff makes it reasonably 
certain by competent proof what the amount of 
his loss actually was. * * * 
"One, however, who would avail himself of this 
exception to the general rule, must bring his proof 
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within th~ reason which warrants the exception. 
He who IS prevented from embarking in a new 
business can recover no profits, because there are 
no provable data of past business from which the 
fact that anticipated profits would have been re-
alized can be legally deduced. * * * 
"And one who seeks to recover for the loss of the 
anticipated prof its of an established business 
without proof of the expenses and income of the 
business for a reasonable length of time before as 
well as during the interruption is in no better sit-
uation. In the absence of such proof, the profits 
he claims remain speculative, remote, uncertain, 
and incapable of recovery. * * * 
.. 
I 
I 
"Expected profits are, in their nature, contingent 
upon many changing circumstances, uncertain 
and remote at best. They can be recovered only 
when they are made reasonably certain by the 
proof of actual facts which present data for a 
rational estimate of their amount. The specula-
tions and conjectures of witnesses who know no 
facts from which a reasonably accurate estimate 
can be made form no better basis for a judgment 
than the conjectures of the jury without facts. 
The plaintiff in this case had his bank account at 
his command, which would certainly have given 
him some indication of the volume of his business 
before and after the interruption of which he com- ' 
plained. He had his ledger, in which he testified 
that he had entered the charges of the coal which 
he had sold on credit. The bank account and the 
ledger account together, if properly kept, would 
have given at least an approximate statement of 
the value of the coal which he handled, because ' 
one would have shown his cash receipts, the other 
his charges for coal sold on credit, and the pay-
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ments he received for that coal, and a careful 
comparison of the two would have enabled any in-
telligent bookkeeper to at least approximate the 
value of his business. These books were not pro-
duced. The indispensable facts to warrant a re-
covery of the expected profits of an established 
business were not established. There was no evi-
dence of the amount of capital in the business, of 
its expenses or of its income, either before or after 
its interruption. There were no data for a rational 
estimate of the profits at any time during the con-
tinuance of the business; nothing from which the 
jury could reasonably infer that the business was 
profitable before, less profitable or profitless 
after, the plaintiff's withdrawal from the club. 
* * *" 
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Trinidad Bean 
and Elevator Co., 84 Colo.93, 267 Pac. 1068 ( 1928), 
plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to deliver the last 
of a series of telegrams between plaintiff and its broker 
and as a result of this failure a sale of beans was not con-
summated, resulting in lost profits to plaintiff in the 
amount of $480.00. From a verdict and judgment for 
plaintiff, defendant appealed. 
After holding that there was no contract existing 
between plaintiff and the potential purchaser, the Su-
preme Court of Colorado, reversing, stated: 
"Obviously, the greater number of contingen-
cies brought into the transaction, correspondingly 
the more remote becomes defendant's liability. 
'Ve are struck with the predominance of the inter-
vening 'ifs' between plaintiff and the contract 
claimed to have been lost: [naming twelve con-
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tingenciesJ. And now, and if, the substantial or 
material parts of this combination of circum-
stances had been shown according to the facts of 
a given case, plaintiff might, or might not, have 
made a profit of $480. 
* * * 
"Whether plaintiff could have recovered if the 
proof had sustained the allegations, on a case that 
did not do violence to the above decisions, we do 
not say, for the evidence is plain that the judg-
ment is based on damages, which, at best, were 
remote, conjectural, and speculative, and so can-
not be upheld." 267 Pac. 1068 at 1069. 
Although a party need not prove the amount of 
damages with a mathematical certainty, he must lay be-
fore the trier of fact the best evidence available under 
the circumstances, so as to enable that trier of fact to 
make the most reasonable estimate as to the amount of 
the loss. 
In Mt. States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
v. Hinchcliffe, 204 F.2d 381 (IO Cir., 1953), plaintiff 
sought to recover lost profits for defendant's negligent 
failure to furnish proper telephone service. 
After stating the general rules applicable to proof 
of lost profits, the Court of Appeals states: 
"However, the plaintiff must establish his dam-
age by the most accurate basis possible under the 
circumstances. He must produce the best evi-
dence reasonably obtainable." 204 F.2d 308 at 
383. 
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The case was cited with approval and followed in 
Garcia v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Co., 315 F.2d 166 ( 10 Cir., 1963). See also Gould v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 6 Utah 
2d 187, 309 P.2d 802 ( 1957), wherein evidence of lost 
prospective profits was deemed insufficient to justify an 
award therefor; and United States v. Griffith, Gornall 
and Carman, Inc., 210F.2d11 (10Cir.,1954), in which 
testimony and estimates of a company president respect-
ing future contracts were rejected as "pure guesswork." 
A case involving the length of time over which lost 
profits might be recovered is Schoenberg v. Forrest, 253 
S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App., 1952), brought by a sales 
agent for breach of a twenty year sales agency contract 
which had been in existence approximately eight months 
when it was wrongfully terminated by the principal. The 
sales agent put before the jury evidence of the amounts 
received upon sales commissions for the eight months; 
that smaller figures in two of the months were a result of 
development work in New York which was new terri-
tory; and an estimate of expenses. On the basis of figures 
it appeared that he received approximately $774.62 more 
per month from commissions than he paid out in ex-
penses. The appeals court held that on this evidence a 
jury verdict awarding plaintiff $123,200.00 could not be 
permitted to stand. In its discussion of the measure of 
damages the court said: 
"The most serious defect in appellee's proof 
and one which is fatal to the judgment is the fail-
ure to establish facts from which it could reason-
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ably be inferred that prof its over the contractual 
period of twenty year_s would be realiz.ed. * * * in 
addition to showing of reasonable probability of 
profit during such term. In short term contracts 
such showing is generally apparent, and in num-
erous reported cases it appears that the term had 
expired prior to the time of the trial of the case. 
However, in case of long term contracts, proba-
bility of profits for periods of time in the future 
may present a more difficult problem of proof, 
but it must nevertheless be shown. * * * 
"Although the reasonable probability of contin-
uing profits is a matter of proof, this factor was 
seemingly assumed rather than proved in this case. 
This renders the verdict fatally defective as the 
speculations and conjectures of either witnesses 
or jurymen can not supply the deficiency of 
proof. * * * We do not believe it would be objec-
tional, and it might prove of benefit to the mem-
bers of the jury to further instruct them that in 
estimating the damages which have accrued since 
the breach of the contract, if any, including those 
which may result or accrue in the future, if any, 
they shall award as damages, if any they belieYe 
to exist, only such amount as is established by rea-
sonable inference from the evidence adduced br-
fore them, and they should not consider nor in-
clude in their fin dings damages which are remote, 
speculative or based upon conjecture and guess-
work.*** 
"It is incumbent upon the plaintiff under the 
'rule of certainty' to bring forward the most con-
vincing evidence available to support his theory 
of damages." 253 S.W.2d 331 at 335, 336. (Em-
phasis added.) 
In that case the plaintiff's proof was much stronger 
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than that presented in the instant case inasmuch as the 
plaintiff did prove a contract for a twenty year term, and 
put on some evidence about the character of the business 
an<l the income and expenses during the period the busi-
ness was in operation. In the instant case we do not have 
a contract for a definite term, but only the fact that Con-
tinental Baking Company had been purchasing bakery 
products under an open account. There is no evidence 
with respect tu the market or the period of time during 
which the business relationship might be expected to 
continue. At least in Schoenberg the jury had a twenty 
year term to speculate about, while in this case the court 
had no such thing. 
To award damages to a commercial enterprise for 
lost profits ten years into the future is to assume that 
there will be no changes of circumstances in that business 
for a decade. Such an assumption takes no notice of the 
possibilities of increased competition, of increased costs 
of labor, material and other overhead expenses, of a de-
pressed market, of the expiration and non-renewal of the 
lease under the terms of which respondent remained on 
the premises, of unforeseen injuries to the equipment and 
premises, of replacement of equipment necessitated by 
ordinary wear and tear and the expenses attendant there-
to, of the continued financial success of the business 
which would preclude the necessity of incurring extra-
ordinary obligations and the cost of discharging them. 
Moreover, there must be an additional assumption that 
nothing will happen to the operations of the customer 
whose business was allegedly lost. 
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To award damages while ignoring all of the possible 
contingencies that could occur in the course of ten years 
time is speculative and conjectural in the extreme. 
In addition to awarding excessive "actual damages· 
the trial court awarded $3,000 punitive damages. Hut 
there was no evidence to justify such an award. The clos-
ing of the building in which Kratzer's operated its bak-
ery was accomplished by the sheriff's execution on a writ 
regularly issued by the District Court, at the instance of 
Mr. Monter's attorneys. 
Punitive damages are improper under the holding in 
Calhoun v. Universal Credit Company, 106 Utah 166, 
146 P.2d 284 ( 1944), involving repossession of an auto-
mobile. Plaintiff had been continually late in his pay-
ments; when he was about to be inducted into the Army, 
plaintiff arranged with defendant for some time to dis-
pose of the contract. Later, defendant made several at-
tempts to contact plaintiff concerning the disposition of ' 
the automobile but was unable to reach him. Finally, the 
1 
agent repossessed the automobile without process and it . 
was subsequently resold. The trial court found that there 1 
had been a waiver of strict compliance with the terms of 
the contract and that the repossession was wrongful. 
The trial court awarded actual damages in the 
amount of $247.00 and punitive damages in the amount 
of $200.00. 
Holding that the trial court was correct in awarding ; 
actual damages, the court struck down the award of 
punitive damages: 
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"* * * the evidence comes within the rule laid 
down in Hall v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 
Co., 224 Mo. Ap. 431, 28 S.W.2d, 687, 691, cited 
by defendant as follows: 'The party must know 
that the act is wrongful and must do it intention-
ally without just cause or excuse. If he acts in 
good faith and in the honest belief that his act is 
lawful, he is not liable for punitive damages even 
though he may be mistaken as to the legality of 
his act. [citing cases]' 
"To the same effect is Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Ut. 
295, 117 P. 54, 57, where the court quoting from 
Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo. 203, 210, 40 P. 
499, 501, says: 
"'To justify a recovery of exemplary damages, 
the act causing the injury must be done with an 
evil intent and with the purpose of injuring the 
plaintiff, or with such a wanton and reckless dis-
regard of his rights as evidences a wrongful mo-
tive.' 
"* * * The trial court awarded punitive dam-
ages, after making a finding that the conversion 
was malicious. The evidence does not sustain such 
a finding .... " 146 P.2d 284 at 288. (Emphasis 
by court.) 
The fact that appellant's attorney may have been 
told by respondent's attorney that a writ of restitution 
should not, under 78-36-10, issue until five days after the 
entry of the judgment is insufficient to justify an award 
of punitive damages. The fact that appellant released the 
premises to respondent within two hours after the clos-
ing indicates a lack of malice on the part of Mr. Monter 
and his attorneys. 
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IV 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 
grant plaintiff's motion for new trial. 
It is well settled in Utah that while the trial court is 
given wide discretion in granting a motion for new trial ! 
its decision may be reviewed on appeal to determine if 
that discretion has been abused. See, for example, Crcilin 
v. Tihomas, 122Utah122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952). 
In the instant case, an indispensable determination ' 
to be made by the trial court was the length of time into 
the future that respondent would have continued doing 
business with Continental Baking Company. There was • 
no substantial evidence as to the length of time the busi- ' 
ness might reasonably be expected to continue, and no 
evidence was introduced to show that the business would 
continue for another ten years. However, the trial court 
awarded damages based on lost profits for ten years from 
the date of the trial. 
Thereafter, appellant discovered a substantial debt 
owed by respondent to the United States Internal Reve-
nue Service, which debt existed at the time of trial, al-
though the IRS lien was not recorded until a month after 1 
the trial. The trial court assumed that respondent's busi-
ness with Continental Baking would continue for an ad-
ditional ten years but, in fact, respondent's business was 
closed within a month after the trial, and has remained I 
closed. 
It is well settled that when newly discovered evi-
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dence would produce a different result at trial or would 
materially reduce the amount of the recovery the trial 
court abuses its discretion in failing to grant a new trial 
grounded on the newly discovered evidence. 
For example, in Bates v. Winkle, 208 Okla. 199, 
254 P.2d 361 ( 1953), plaintiff recovered a judgment, 
based on a jury verdict, for $20,000 as damages for per-
manent injuries sustained in an automobile accident. At 
trial, plaintiff introduced evidence to the effect that she 
had suffered permanent physical incapacity resulting 
from her injuries and as a result she would be unable to 
follow her usual occupation of paper hanging and in-
terior decorating. Further corroborating testimony was 
introduced tending to establish her permanent disability. 
Thereafter, defendants filed separate motions for new 
trial grounded on newly discovered evidence to the effect 
that plaintiff, during the time of her alleged injury, had 
performed her usual occupation and had told individuals 
that she had been uninjured in the automobile accident. 
From the trial court's decision denying their motion for 
new trial, defendants appealed. 
After stating the requirements for a new trial 
grounded on newly discovered evidence, the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma stated, citing 39 Am.Jur., New 
Trial, §158: 
"The rule to be deduced from the cases is that 
where newly discovered evidence is of such con-
clusive nature, or of such decisive or preponder-
ating character that it would with reasonable cer-
tainty have changed the verdict or materially re-
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~u.ce_d the. recovery, a new trial should be granted 
if it IS satisfactorily shown why the evidence Wa) 
not discovered and produced at time of trial." 25.J. 
P.2d 261 at 363. 
And further, citing 39 Am.J ur., New Trial, §165: 
"The application for a new trial should be 
granted where it appears that the additional evi-
dence, if it had been introduced at trial, would 
have caused the jury to reach a different conclu-
sion, or where its effect would have been to re-
duce the recovery materially. A new trial is to be 
granted when the newly discovered evidence is of 
a conclusive nature or of such decisive prepond-
erating character as would, with reasonable cer-
tainty, have changed the verdict or materially re-
duced or increased the recovery, ... " 254 P.2d 
361 at 364. 
Commenting on the evidence, the court stated: 
"Plaintiff sought damages for personal in· 
juries which were claimed to be of a permanent 
nature. The evidence was conflicting in this re· 
spect. Her evidence was that she commenced tc 
suffer from such injuries shortly after the acci· 
dent, was unable to work and was wholly incapa· 
citated to perform even household duties. Th( 
newly discovered evidence offered by defendant~ 
was not cumulative, but was of a direct and posi 
tive nature, tending to present defendants' theor) 
of the case to the effect that plaintiff's disabilit) 
was from a preexisting condition and was not th1 
result of the accident; and that any injuries wer1 
not sufficiently serious to warrant so large a ver 
diet based upon permanent, physical disability 
Had a new trial been granted and this evidenc 
presented to the jury, it most probably woul1 
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have caused the jury to reach a different conclu-
sion or, in any event, would have materially re-
duced the recovery." 254 P.2d 361 at 364. 
Had the evidence of the substantial debt owed by 
respondent to the I.R.S. been introduced at trial there is 
little doubt that that evidence would not only have shown 
Kratzer's business was not profitable, but would have 
affected the trial court's decision as to the length of time 
respondent would have retained Continental Baking 
Company as a customer. Evidence to the effect that re-
spondent would have little likelihood of remaining in 
business would certainly have reduced the amount of re-
covery given by the trial court. Under the circumstances, 
the failure by the trial court to grant a new trial based on 
this newly discovered evidence must be deemed to be an 
abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
This case, if allowed to stand, will be a monumental 
miscarriage of justice. The trial court may have done a 
capable accounting job in "capitalizing" figures, but the 
figures used ( 10 years and a return of 41/2 % ) were as-
sumed, not proved (R. 154, 167, 174). There was no evi-
dence of anticipated return on investments or that the 
business would continue for a period of at least ten years 
or that during that period it would continue to realize 
prof its in accordance with the stipulation entered into by 
c.:ounsel. The fact of the continuance of the business and 
its continued profitability cannot be assumed; it must be 
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proved. There was no evidence as to the length of time 
the relationship between Kratzer's and Contillental Bak. 
ing Company might continue. Indeed in his comments to 
the court the counsel for Kratzer's virtually conceede<l 
this when he suggested that the length of time for which 
damages should be awarded was probably "a legal 
matter." 
The trial court should not have reached the damages 
issue in any event inasmuch as there was no wrong com-
mitted by Mr. Monter against Kratzer's. Under the pro-
visions of 78-36-10 U.C.A. 1953 a plaintiff has a right tu 
execute immediately on a writ of restitution issued 
against a defaulting tenant. To permit a tenant to ignore 
the statutory notices to quit given by a landlord, then to 
ignore the summons, and finally to come in and tender 
the amount of rent due, thus depriving a landlord of any 
effective remedy for the recovery of his premises, would 
amount to a virtual taking of the landlord's property 
without due process of law, contrary to Amendments V 
and XIV, U.S. Constitution. This is particularly true 
where the lease contains a provision that upon def a ult of 
the payment of rent the leasehold interest may be ter· 
minated and the landlord may retake possession of the 
premises. The decision of the trial court in this case per-
mits a defaulting tenant to thumb his nose at his landlord 
again and again. 
The trial court's determination to punish Mr. Mon· 
ter and his counsel became apparent when on the motion 
for a new trial, the court refused to consider facts which 
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would have made completely irrelevant its computation 
of ten years' profits. Kratzer's Bakery was not making a 
profit. The loss of the Continental Baking Company ac-
count could not have led to its demise since the maximum 
"cash flow" talked about in the case was $1,060.00. It 
would not go very far toward retiring debts including 
$18,000.00 in taxes and $14,000.00 in unsatisfied judg-
ments. 
The case should be reversed and remanded to the 
District Court of Salt Lake County with directions to 
enter judgment for the plaintiff, including judgment for 
reasonable attorneys fee, and to dismiss the counterclaim. 
At the very least, the court should be ordered to grant 
Mr. Monter a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
William A. Stegall, Jr. 
ROE, FOWLER, JERMAN & DART 
340 East Fourth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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